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DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 
DURING 2005 
 
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY IN 2005 
A. Introduction 
The Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) domestic policy directive prescribes that the Trading Desk 
(Desk) of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) foster conditions in the reserves market 
consistent with maintaining the federal funds rate at an average around a specified target rate.  Accordingly, 
the Desk arranges open market operations to target the federal funds rate and to achieve simultaneously 
other objectives for the structure of Federal Reserve holdings of domestic financial assets. 
 
This report reviews the conduct of open market operations during 2005.  First, we describe operating 
procedures used by the Desk to influence the federal funds rate and summarize key new developments in 
the policy implementation framework.  Then, we describe demand for balances at the Federal Reserve and 
the behavior of autonomous factors—balance sheet items outside of the control of the Desk—that affect the 
supply of these balances.  We review the composition of domestic financial assets held by the Federal 
Reserve and the various types of open market operations used to adjust them.  Finally, we discuss the 
behavior of the federal funds rate in 2005 and the use of the discount window as a tool in the day-to-day 
implementation of monetary policy. 
 
B. Overview of Operational Procedures to Control the Federal Funds Rate 
The federal funds target rate was increased at each of the eight FOMC meetings in 2005, rising from 2 ¼ 
percent at the start of the year to 4 ¼ percent at the end of the year (Table 1).  On each occasion, the Board 
of Governors approved an increase in the primary credit rate to maintain a spread of 100 basis points above 
the federal funds rate target.
1 
Table 1  
Federal Funds Rate Target and Primary Credit Rate (percent)       
         Federal Funds    Primary    
Effective Date      Target Rate    Credit Rate     
December 14, 2004    2.25      3.25       
February 2, 2005     2.50      3.50       
March 22, 2005      2.75      3.75       
May 3, 2005      3.00      4.00       
June 30, 2005      3.25      4.25       
August 9, 2005      3.50      4.50       
September 20, 2005    3.75      4.75       
November 1, 2005    4.00      5.00       
December 13, 2005    4.25      5.25       
                                                            
1 A spread of 150 basis points of the secondary credit rate over the federal funds rate target was also preserved.  
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To influence the federal funds rate, the Desk conducts open market operations to align the supply of 
balances held by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve—or Fed balances—with banks’ demand to 
hold balances consistent with the funds rate around the target.  Each morning, the Desk considers whether 
open market operations are needed based on estimates of the supply of and demand for Fed balances.   
 
The average level of Fed balances that banks demand over a two-week reserve maintenance period 
consistent with the funds rate remaining around the target is in large part determined by requirements to 
hold Fed balances, with only a small level of additional, or excess, balances typically demanded.  The 
federal funds rate can move above the target rate if Fed balances fall so low that some banks have difficulty 
finding sufficient funds to cover required balance deficiencies or potential overdrafts in their Fed accounts.  
Conversely, the federal funds rate can fall below the target rate if Fed balances are so high that some banks 
risk ending a maintenance period holding undesired excess balances.  From time to time when the funds 
rate deviates from the target, despite reserve levels being in line with requirements, the Desk may increase 
or decrease the supply of reserves accordingly. 
 
Depository institutions may average their holdings of Fed balances over the days within a maintenance 
period to meet requirements, which gives them considerable leeway in day-to-day account management.  
This flexibility can absorb some volatility in the funds rate that might otherwise develop when reserve 
supply and demand are misaligned. 
 
C. New Developments in 2005 
Further Changes to the Calculation of Earnings Credits on Clearing Balances 
Following upon changes implemented in early 2004, additional revisions to the formula for computing the 
earnings credits on contractual clearing balances became effective on January 6, 2005.  The changes 
effectively further reduced the earnings credit rate.
2 
 
Elimination of the Limit on Changes in the SOMA between FOMC Meetings 
At the February 1-2, 2005 FOMC meeting, the Committee amended the Authorization for Domestic Open 
Market Operations, removing any limit to the net change in the System Open Market Account (SOMA) 
between FOMC meetings.  In practice, this limit or “leeway,” most recently at $12 billion, had not been a 
binding factor on Desk operations for many years. 
 
 
                                                            
2 For more information on the change, the original announcement from the Board of Governors can be found at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/meetings/2004/20041104/2005RepricingMemo.pdf. 
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Replacement of Automated Auction Platform for Securities Lending Operations 
On November 7, 2005, the Desk replaced its automated auction platform for conducting securities lending 
auctions with its market counterparties.  The previous mainframe-based Trading Room Automated 
Processing System (TRAPS) was replaced by an up-to-date infrastructure and interface, named FedTrade.  
In 2006, the same system will be employed to conduct outright operations, repurchase agreement (RP) 
operations, and reverse repurchase agreement (RRP) operations, replacing the TRAPS system which has 
supported these operations since 1994. 
 
Revisions to Procedures for the Desk’s Daily Survey of Overnight RP Rates 
On October 11, 2005 the Desk implemented modest revisions to its daily procedures for collecting data 
from the primary dealers that is used to calculate benchmark overnight RP rates.  These benchmark rates 
are used in the Desk’s short-term RPs to allocate accepted propositions across collateral tranches.  The 
revisions were made to ensure more uniformity in the data collected from the different dealers in order to 
construct more accurate measures of current market spreads between RP rates for different collateral types. 
 
II. BANKS’ DEMAND FOR FED BALANCES 
Total demand for Fed balances can be broken down into two components:  the portion needed to meet all 
balance requirements and the portion held in excess of these requirements. 
 
A. Total Balance Requirements 
A bank's total balance requirement is the average level of balances it must hold at its Reserve Bank over a 
two-week maintenance period to meet all obligations. This requirement has a regulatory and a contractual 
component.  The regulatory component is called the required reserve balance and is equal to the portion of 
reserve requirements not met with vault cash.  The contractual component is called the clearing balance 
requirement.  Required reserve balances might be affected by the application of “as-of” adjustments.  Such 
adjustments might be made to correct Reserve Bank accounting transaction errors, to correct reporting 
errors (including deposit reporting errors), to recover float incurred by an institution, or to address other 
circumstances.  Required reserve balances, clearing balance requirements, and most as-of adjustments are 
known at the start of each maintenance period, which facilitates the Desk's estimation of the overall 
demand for Fed balances. 
 
Both required reserve balances and clearing balance requirements contracted over 2005 (Chart 1).  While 
the precise factors behind the declines in requirements in 2005 are not certain, historically, both reserve 
requirements and clearing balance requirements have tended to move inversely with short-term interest 
rates.  Rising rates both raise the opportunity cost to households and businesses of holding reservable 
deposits at banks, and reduce the level of clearing balance obligations a bank would need to generate       
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income credits sufficient to cover its use of Federal Reserve Bank priced services.
3  Since the start of the 
interest rate tightening cycle in mid-2004, total requirements have erased about half of the gains from their 
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B. Excess Balances   
Excess balances are balances held by institutions at the Fed that are above the level of total requirements.  
Excess balances earn no interest and therefore represent a lost investment opportunity.  But many 
institutions, especially small banks that lack access to wholesale funding markets, routinely hold a modest 
amount of excess balances to mitigate the potential for end-of-day overdrafts.  Demand for excess is an 




                                                            
3 The reference in footnote 2 also discusses the calculation and use of income credits earned on balances held to meet 
clearing balance requirements.  The changes to the formula for calculating earned income credits may have been an 
additional factor in the decline in clearing balance requirements in both 2004 and 2005. 
 
4 Total requirements fell dramatically over the 1990s as a result of cuts in reserve requirement ratios and declines in 
reserve requirements associated with the growth of retail deposit sweep accounts at depository institutions.       
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Excess levels averaged $1.78 billion in 2005 and were in line with 2004 levels (Chart 2).  The volatility of 
maintenance period average excess levels was a bit higher in 2005 than in the preceding year; the standard 























In designing open market operations, the Desk aims to satisfy banks’ demands for holding Fed balances on 
a daily as well as on a maintenance period-average basis.  Excluding maintenance periods in which patterns 
were strongly influenced by expectations of a policy change, daily reserve demand in 2005 was heavily 
weighted towards the last three days of each maintenance period, in line with the preceding year (Chart 3).    
  
During all the maintenance periods in 2005 that contained an FOMC meeting, as with the last five such 
periods in 2004, a policy tightening was widely anticipated in the days ahead of the meeting.  In these 
periods, the Desk accommodated banks’ desires to accumulate more reserves to meet their requirements 
under the prevailing, lower target rate ahead of the meeting (Chart 4).
5  In 2005, the Desk also was more 
aggressive in running down the large average-to-date excess positions built up in the early part of these 
periods in the days immediately following the FOMC meeting than it was in the preceding year.  
                                                            
5 The day on which an FOMC meeting falls within a maintenance period can affect the daily pattern.  In most of the 
FOMC periods captured in this chart, the FOMC date fell on the first Tuesday.  A discussion of the behavior of the 
federal funds rate on these occasions appears in section V.A.       
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Chart 3:  Average Daily Levels of Excess Balances by
Day of Maintenance Period, excluding Maintenance Periods containing 
FOMC meetings from June 30, 2004




























Chart 4:  Average Daily Levels of Excess Balances by
Day of Maintenance Period, only Maintenance Periods containing FOMC 
meetings from June 30, 2004
Note: Excess is calculated using period-average levels of all as-of adjustments. 
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III.   AUTONOMOUS FACTORS AFFECTING THE SUPPLY OF FED BALANCES 
The supply of Fed balances is determined by the size of the Federal Reserve’s domestic financial assets, 
discount window loans, and the levels of the various autonomous factors on the Federal Reserve's balance 
sheet over which the Desk has little or no control.  In absolute size, autonomous factors consist primarily of 
currency liabilities issued by the Federal Reserve (F.R. notes).  They also include many other balance sheet 
items, both assets and liabilities, the net value of which historically has been relatively small.  The net level 
of autonomous factors—measured as assets less liabilities and so having a negative value—decreased by 
$33 billion in 2005, a little less than the amount by which it decreased in 2004 (Chart 5). 
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Developments in Federal Reserve Notes 
The quantity of F.R. notes outstanding increased by 5.4 percent ($39 billion) during 2005, above the 4.3 
percent rate at which notes increased during 2004 and almost identical to the rate at which they grew during 
2003.
6  However, as represented by the seasonally adjusted currency component of M1, monthly currency 
growth rates were erratic (Chart 6).
7 Variations in the net volume of currency shipments to foreign 




                                                            
6 These calculations are based on year-end date levels. 
 
7 The average monthly growth rate in this series in 2005 was a bit below that in 2004.       
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Chart 6:  Growth of the Currency Component of M1 
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Developments in the Treasury Balance 
Treasury’s overall cash position (general balance), defined as funds held in the Treasury’s account with the 
Federal Reserve plus all balances held in Treasury Tax and Loan (TT&L) note accounts at commercial 
banks (including term investments), was higher on average in 2005 than in the preceding year (Chart 7).   
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Treasury held larger and more frequent auctions of funds under the Term Investment Option (TIO) 
program.  Many commercial banks that participated in the TIO auctions withdrew some of the collateral 
they had previously tended to keep in place over extended periods for regular TT&L investments, and they 
increased TT&L capacity for TIO placements only temporarily during high tax receipt months.  
Consequently, total TT&L capacity was on average lower and more volatile than in 2004.  Despite the 
more challenging operational environment of lower average TT&L capacity and higher general balances, 
Treasury was generally able to keep its balance at the Fed close to its usual daily $5 billion target in 2005.  
As in 2004, in 2005 there were no dates on which general balances exceeded total TT&L capacity by more 
than the $5 billion amount targeted for the Fed account.  Meanwhile, in 2005, there were 6 days when 
general balances were below the usual $5 billion amount targeted for the Fed account, down from 12 such 
occasions in the preceding year.
8  
 
Developments in Statement Float 
In 2005 Federal Reserve float levels were on average quite similar to the prior year until the final quarter.  
The average daily float level in Q4 2005 was $1.35 billion, by far the highest quarterly average level in 
recent years (Chart 8).    
 
Chart 8: Quarterly Averages of Daily Statement Float Levels


























                                                            
8 There was one additional occasion in 2004 when the general balance, less an amount previously placed in a TIO 
investment that was outstanding on the day, was less than $5 billion.       
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Several interrelated factors likely led to the heightened float levels, including the ongoing consolidation of 
Federal Reserve check processing operations.  By concentrating activity at a smaller number of regional 
offices, a disruption of work at one office or delays in the transportation of checks between any two offices 
seem to have a larger impact on float levels. 
 
Volatility and Predictability of Key Autonomous Factors  
The variability of autonomous factors, as measured by average absolute daily changes, increased from the 
prior year, largely due to increased variability of float and of the foreign RP pool (Table 2).  Average same-
day float forecasting misses increased as a consequence of this increased variability, and overall same-day 
forecasting misses increased along with it.  However, accuracy of same-day projections of the pool was 
about the same in 2005 as in the preceding year, despite the higher volatility.   
 
Table 2  
Daily Changes and Forecast Misses in Autonomous Factors (millions of dollars) 
Average and maximum of absolute values            
Daily Change 
        2003      2004      2005   
      Average  Max.    Average  Max.    Average   Max.   
  Currency in  
       circulation        858    3,128         918    3,510         855    2,930   
  Treasury balance     745    3,552         763    4,272         704    4,942   
  Foreign RP pool      629    4,325         599    5,219         756    6,773   
  Float      1,059    6,704         721    5,724          943    6,572   
  Net value*    1,690    8,017      1,356    7,209      1,666    7,483   
 
Daily Forecast Miss             
        2003      2004      2005   
      Average  Max.    Average  Max.    Average   Max. 
Currency in  
      circulation       163       919         200    1,566         213    1,561   
Treasury balance      489    2,224         415    2,353         444    4,277   
Foreign RP pool         86    1,506         125    1,716         148    1,768   
Float         551    4,020         374    2,811         594    5,803   
Net value*       803    3,805         654    3,920         876    8,156   
Notes:             
* Net value reflects offsetting movements and forecast misses of all autonomous factors.   
         
 
 
IV. DOMESTIC FINANCIAL ASSETS & OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 
A. Different Types of Open Market Operations and Their General Uses  
The Federal Reserve maintains a mix of domestic financial assets to achieve its monetary policy objectives. 
Most of the assets in its portfolio are Treasury securities that are held outright (Chart 9).  The Federal 
Reserve also holds government securities on a temporary basis under repurchase agreements and       
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occasionally issues temporary liabilities delivering Treasury securities under reverse repurchase 
agreements.  
 
Chart 9:  Total Domestic Portfolio and Net Autonomous 
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Long-term Repos, Left Scale
Outright holdings of the SOMA, Left Scale




In general, the Desk structures these domestic financial assets so that short-term RPs, defined as RPs with 
an original maturity of less than 13 days, are used to make marginal adjustments to the supply of Fed 
balances.  Short-term RPs are arranged most days, after reserve supply and demand projections are 
complete.  Less utilized, RRPs are arranged when the level of Fed balances needs to be reduced temporarily 
(after accounting for all short-term RPs maturing that day). 
 
The Desk also arranges long-term RPs, defined as RPs with original maturities of 13 days or more, to 
address seasonal volatility in autonomous factors or swings in demands for reserve balances that are 
expected to last for a number of weeks or even months.  Long-term RPs are ordinarily arranged weekly 
each Thursday.  These operations are typically arranged early in the morning when the financing market is 
more liquid, and usually before daily reserve supply and demand projections are complete.  These RPs can 
be reduced as an alternative to arranging RRPs for extended periods or selling securities outright from the 
domestic portfolio in the event that the total portfolio in future weeks or months proves to be persistently 
lower than currently projected.  
 
The Desk addresses permanent increases in the level of autonomous factor liabilities through outright 
purchases of Treasury securities for the SOMA.  Maturing securities held outright are then routinely 
exchanged for new issues at primary auctions.  Less commonly, redemptions and sales of portfolio holdings       
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may be used to achieve reductions to the portfolio that are expected to be permanent, or to avoid exceeding 
guidelines for holdings of specific issues.   
 
B. Temporary Holdings and Operations  
Outstanding Levels of Short-Term and Long-Term RPs 
Longer term financial assets (both outright holdings and long-term RPs) in the domestic portfolio are 
structured to allow for an expected layer of short-term RPs, the size of which is built up or drawn down 
through more frequent market entry to offset short-lived changes to net autonomous factors and reserve 
demands.  The average level of short-term RPs (less RRPs) outstanding was $8.5 billion in 2005 versus 
$7.5 billion in 2004, and ranged between $6.4 billion and $15.5 billion on a maintenance period average 
basis (Chart 10).  Daily amounts outstanding ranged from $1.75 billion to $24.0 billion.   
 

















The average level of outstanding long-term RPs was $17.6 billion in 2005, close to its average in 2004 
(Chart 11).  Maintenance period average levels ranged from $11.0 billion to $30.0 billion (and the highest 
daily level outstanding was $32.0 billion, in the period covering the year-end). 
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Short-Term and Long-Term Temporary Operations 
The Desk arranged short-term RPs on all but 7 business days in 2005, compared to all but 17 days during 
2004.  A total of 204 overnight RPs were arranged in 2005 (including those spanning a holiday or a 
weekend), while the Desk arranged 52 other short-term RPs, both amounts similar to corresponding levels 
in the preceding year (Chart 12).  In size, the average for all short-term temporary operations during 2005 
was $6.4 billion, and individual amounts ranged between $1.75 billion and $13.5 billion.  The Desk 
arranged no temporary draining operations in 2005. 
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The Desk arranged a 14-day RP every Thursday morning.  These operations averaged $8.7 billion in size 
and ranged between $4.0 billion and $14.0 billion.
9  In addition, it arranged a $5 billion 28-day RP to help 
meet projected elevated seasonal reserve needs around the year-end.  The 28-day RP was conducted on a 1-
day forward commitment basis.    
 
The average bid-to-cover ratio for all RP operations during 2005 was 8.0.  This ratio was very volatile from 
operation to operation, but in general it was lower for overnight RPs than for other RPs (Chart 13).  The 
Desk continued to minimize the potential for having insufficient coverage on its overnight RPs by 
arranging overlapping term operations to layer in balances ahead of days when dealer participation on 
overnight RPs has sometimes been low and projected balance needs high (such as quarter-end dates). 
 
Chart 13:  Bid-to-Cover Ratios by Operation Type in 
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Collateral Distribution of Repurchase Agreements  
The Desk solicited propositions across the entire pool of eligible government securities collateral on all RPs 
arranged in 2005. All RPs were arranged as three separate simultaneous operations (tranches), 
differentiated by the type of collateral eligible. In the first tranche, only Treasury debt was accepted; in the 
second, direct federal agency obligations were also eligible (in addition to Treasury securities); and, in the 
third, mortgage-backed securities were eligible in addition to the first two collateral types.  The Desk 
selected from propositions across the three tranches according to the attractiveness of bids, measured 
relative to current rates in the financing market for each particular class of collateral.  Benchmark rates for 
this purpose were based on an internal daily survey of financing rates paid by the primary dealers.  Overall, 
                                                            
9 These figures include long-term RPs of slightly greater or lesser maturity arranged around Thursday holidays.        
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in recent years the distribution by collateral tranche of outstanding RPs has been weighted heavily toward 
the Treasury tranche, which on average has accounted for about 80 percent of all outstanding RPs, both 
long-term and short-term, roughly similar to their 2004 averages (Charts 14a and 14b).     
 
Chart 14a:  Quarterly Average Levels of Long Term RPs 

























Chart 14b:  Quarterly Average Levels of Short Term RPs 
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C. Permanent Holdings in the System Open Market Account and Outright Activity 
During 2005, the par value of the SOMA portfolio increased by $24.0 billion, ending the year at $739.5 
billion.
10  The expansion was achieved by $28.1 billion of outright purchases, mostly in the secondary 
market from primary dealers, supplemented by some purchases for the SOMA of Treasury bills from 
foreign central banks and other international institutions that hold accounts with the Federal Reserve.  
Purchases were partly offset by a moderate amount of redemptions of maturing securities (Chart 15). 
 
















Purchases in both the secondary and primary markets are aimed at maintaining a liquid portfolio, while 
avoiding significantly distorting prices or liquidity of specific Treasury securities.  Consequently, SOMA 
holdings are comprised of an array of Treasury securities with varying remaining maturities, and are 
constrained by per-issue purchase limit guidelines for individual Treasury issues as set forth in July 2000.   
  
Secondary Market Purchases 
The distribution of purchases in 2005 was similar overall to that of 2004, the most notable exception being 
a large relative increase of purchases in the 3-5 year sector (Chart 16).  The change to monthly 5-year note 




                                                            
10 This level excludes $3.3 billion in inflation compensation on Treasury inflation-indexed securities.  The inflation 
compensation component in the portfolio increased by $1.1 billon over the year.  
 
11 Purchasable room is defined as the maximum amount available for purchases within the limits set in the guidelines.       
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Chart 16:  SOMA Secondary Market Purchases of  





















Outright operations with the primary dealers are typically conducted mid-morning, when market liquidity is 
relatively high, and are scheduled to avoid coinciding with major economic data releases or Treasury 
auctions.  Outright operations generally settle on the following business day and, therefore, do not have a 
same-day impact on Fed balances.  Purchases from foreign central banks and international institutions are 
made in notably smaller amounts on a day-to-day basis when there is a need to expand Fed balances and 
sell orders from these accounts are in line with the SOMA portfolio guidelines.  These trades are typically 
arranged for same-day settlement.  
   
Treasury coupon operations continued to be segmented into separate tranches across different portions of 
the yield curve to facilitate efficient execution.  The selection of specific issues in each operation was based 
on the relative attractiveness of propositions and on portfolio considerations.  In addition to remaining 
within the per-issue limits, the Desk avoided purchases that would be expected to cause a sizable 
redemption on any day within the foreseeable future, and it bought no issues in the secondary market that 
had less than five weeks remaining until maturity.  The Desk also refrained from purchasing issues that 
were trading with significant scarcity value in the RP market in order to avoid impairing the liquidity of 
individual securities that were in greater demand elsewhere.  In a similar vein, the Desk refrained from 
purchasing newly issued securities in the secondary market. 
 
Altogether, in 2005 the Desk bought $24.8 billion from the dealers in 24 outright operations arranged in the 
market, and it bought another $3.3 billion (all bills) for the SOMA from foreign accounts.   In the preceding       
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year, the Desk purchased $43.5 billion from dealers in 40 operations arranged in the market, while buying 
another $7.0 billion from foreign accounts. 
 
Primary Market Activity 
Growth in the SOMA portfolio is achieved through outright purchases of Treasury securities in the 
secondary market, which is then sustained by replacing maturing holdings with newly issued debt at 
Treasury auctions.  The auction rollover process differs slightly for coupon and discount securities.  For 
coupons, the Desk rolls over maturing securities by placing add-on bids for the SOMA at auction equal to 
the lesser of (a) its maturing holdings on the issue date of a new security or (b) the amount that would bring 
the SOMA holdings as a percentage of the issue to the percentage guideline limits.  In scenarios when two 
or more coupon securities settle on the same date, the Desk rolls over funds based on percentages outlined 
in the guidelines, which are higher for shorter dated issues.  For bill rollovers, the maturing amount is 
allocated across newly issued bills to maintain roughly an equal percentage amount of ownership in each 
security settling on the same date. 
 
There were six redemptions in 2005 totaling $4.1 billion, all occurring when new 2-year note auctions 
settled.  On these occasions, the size of maturing issues exceeded the percentage guideline limits for 
holdings of specific issues multiplied by the size of the newly auctioned notes.  The last redemption was in 
2001. 
 
Treasury inflation indexed securities (TIIS) were purchased for the SOMA at a primary auction when a 
portion of a maturing 2-year note was exchanged for $3 billion of a 20-year TIIS.  This was the first 
purchase of TIIS at a primary auction since January 2002. 
 
The Treasury redeemed three callable coupon securities held in the SOMA portfolio in 2005, totaling $3.2 
billion.  The Desk rolled over these funds into securities with settlement dates matching the redemption 
dates.  
 
General Characteristics of the SOMA at Year End 
The distribution of SOMA holdings by remaining maturity at the end of 2005 is shown in Chart 17.  The 
average remaining maturity of the SOMA portfolio was 38.0 months at the end of the year, compared to an 
average remaining maturity of 53.9 months on all outstanding marketable Treasury debt.
12  At the end of 
2004, average remaining maturity of the SOMA portfolio and of outstanding Treasury debt was 38.8 
months and 55.1 months, respectively.  At the end of 2005, 17.8 percent of total outstanding marketable 
Treasury debt was held in the portfolio, down slightly from 18.1 percent one year earlier.  
                                                            
12 All calculations in this paragraph are based on par values.       
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Chart 17:  Treasury Securities in the SOMA at Year-End by Maturity Range
(billions of dollars and as a percent of total holdings)
 
 
SOMA Securities Lending Activity 
The FRBNY provides a temporary source of securities to the Treasury financing market via a securities 
lending program to promote smooth clearing of Treasury securities. The program offers for loan, on an 
overnight basis, outright holdings in the SOMA portfolio in accordance with specified terms and 
conditions.
13  Securities are awarded to primary dealers based on competitive bidding in an auction held 
each business day at noon eastern standard time. To prevent securities lending operations from affecting 
Fed balances, securities loans are collateralized with Treasury securities rather than cash.  Over the course 
of 2005, the Desk maintained the minimum fee for the SOMA securities lending program at 1 percent.  
 
Securities lending volume increased significantly in 2005, averaging about $3 billion daily (Chart 18).  The 
rise in borrowing activity over the course of the year was at least partially attributable to the gradual rise in 
the target level of the federal funds rate, which in turn caused general collateral (GC) funding rates, which 
are closely aligned to the funds rate, to rise as well.   The rise in GC rates increased the scope for specific 
issues to be financed in the RP market at rates more than 1 percent (the Desk’s minimum borrowing fee) 
below the general collateral rate, the range in which dealers have an incentive to borrow from the Desk.  
Quarter-end borrowing activity further contributed to the increase in volumes.  The temporary scarcity of 
cheapest-to-deliver securities ahead of quarter-end delivery dates for the Chicago Board of Trade’s 10-year 
Treasury note futures contracts exacerbated borrowing activity during the second and third quarters.   
 
                                                            
13 For terms and conditions of the Federal Reserve’s securities lending program, see 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/sec_terms.html.       
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Chart 18: Securities Lending Volumes Outstanding
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In the fourth quarter of 2005, the Desk successfully implemented its new FedTrade trading platform, 
replacing the TRAPS system previously used.  In addition, the Desk announced in December that dealer 
borrowing limits would be modified as of January 9, 2006 to more efficiently allocate SOMA holdings to 
the primary dealers, particularly during periods of collateral market dislocation.
14   
 
V.  THE FEDERAL FUNDS MARKET AND DISCOUNT WINDOW CREDIT 
A. The Federal Funds Market 
Participants in the federal funds market continued to anticipate with virtual certainty the increases in the 
target federal funds rate ahead of all the FOMC meetings in 2005, which pushed up rates in the days ahead 
of all eight meetings and in general contributed to higher rate volatility in the corresponding maintenance 
periods.
15  The impact of these expectations for a policy change on the funds rate in the days ahead of 
FOMC meetings was in general more pronounced in 2005 than in the preceding year (Chart 19).
16    
                                                            
14 This announcement may be found at the following link: 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2005/an051205.html 
 
15 For a discussion of how expectations of a policy change in general have affected the behavior of the federal funds 
rate since the start of the rate firming cycle in June 2004, please refer to pp. 32-33 of the 2004 Annual Report. 
 
16 To control for other circumstances that can have an impact on rates, observations included in Chart 19 are limited to 
situations where the FOMC meeting fell on the first Tuesday of a maintenance period and in which there were no high 
payment flow dates in the period ahead of the meeting.  The levels of excess reserves provided by the Desk ahead of 
the meeting dates reflected in the chart were somewhat higher in 2005 than in 2004.         
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Chart 19:  Morning Federal Funds Rate Minus Target Rate
(Averages for Maintenance Periods with FOMC Rate Hikes on the First Tuesday 















In 2005, most measures of intraday rate volatility in the federal funds market increased from their low 
levels in 2003 and 2004, even after maintenance periods that featured an increase in the target level of the 
funds rate are excluded (Table 3).  Both the intraday standard deviations in rates and the daily trading 
ranges in 2005 were modestly to substantially above the levels observed in 2004.  Deviations of daily 
effective rates from the target rate were also slightly greater on average in 2005; however, these increases 
were less apparent when periods with an increase in the target funds rate were excluded from the measures.  
The daily average deviations increased most clearly on high payment flow days.  
 
The increase in federal funds rate volatility in 2005 may have been at least partly due to the higher interest 
rate environment.  Volatility in the federal funds rate was exceptionally low in 2003 and 2004, when target 
rates for federal funds were at historical lows.  At that time, the gap between the target rate and the lower 
bound for rates – zero percent – narrowed substantially which, in conjunction with the primary credit 
facility adopted in 2003, effectively limited the potential trading range for rates.  Since that time, the 
potential room for downward rate movements has widened substantially.  In principle at least, the reduced 
levels of required operating balances that have coincided with higher interest rates, described in section 
II.A, might also have contributed to heightened rate volatility by reducing banks’ scope for “averaging” 
reserve holdings over a maintenance period.  Still, levels of rate volatility remained well below levels 
experienced amid the steep decline in total requirements in the 1990s. 
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Table 3 
Federal Funds Rate Behavior (basis points)                                                            non- 
                                                                                                                                                FOMC 
          2001
a  2002  2003  2004  2005  2005
b 
All Days 
Intraday Standard Deviation 
Median           7   5   4   3   4   4 
Average          9   6   5   4   7   6 
 
Daily Trading Range 
Median          56  31  25  19  38  31 
Average         80  44  34  30  55  53 
 
Absolute Deviation of Effective Rate from Target 
Median           5   3   3   1   2   2 
Average          7   4   4   3   5   3 
 
High Payment Flow Days
c 
Intraday Standard Deviation 
Median           8   7   6   4   7             - 
Average         12   9   8   7   9             - 
 
Absolute Deviation of Effective Rate from Target 
Median          11   8   6   4   8             - 
Average         12   6   8   4  10            - 
 
a Excludes data from September 11 through October 3. 
b Excludes all data from maintenance periods with an FOMC meeting. 
c High payment flow dates include the first and last business days of each month, and the first 
business day after the 14
th of each month. 
   
   
B. Discount Window Credit 
The year 2005 was the third year of operation of the primary credit facility as a backup source of very 
short-term liquidity for depository institutions in generally sound financial condition and with appropriate 
collateral.  Reserve Banks extend primary credit at a rate 100 basis points above the fed funds target rate. 
 
Both the frequency with which banks borrowed at least $100 million and the average daily outstanding 
amount of primary credit in 2005 were much the same as in recent prior years (Table 4).  Since the 
inception of the primary credit facility in January 2003, there have been twelve occasions when funds 
brokers reported some trading in the market at rates in excess of the primary credit rate, ten of which 
occurred in 2005.  Thus, some institutions have continued to show a reluctance to borrow from the discount 
window under the primary credit facility, preferring to pay a higher rate in the market.  However, on most 
of these occasions, there was also a substantial amount of borrowing from the primary credit facility, 
indicating that the new facility likely helped limit upward rate pressures even on those days.   
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Table 4 
Average and Frequency of Adjustment/Primary Credit Borrowing 
         
                                                          2001              2002     2003     2004     2005 
 
Averages daily values (mil.$)      $439/$81*          $48       $43       $43       $55 
 (average of business days) 
Number of days when borrowing was … 
     $100 million or more                   36                   13         13          18         15 
     $500 million or more                   13                     6           3            3           5 
 
*Excludes 9/11/01, 9/12/01, and 9/13/01 
           
       
 
24 
     
APPENDIX A:  AUTHORIZATION FOR DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS  
Open market operations were conducted under the Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations.  
The Authorization in effect at the end of 2005 is reprinted below:  
 
 
Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations 
1. The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to 
the extent necessary to carry out the most recent domestic policy directive adopted at a meeting of the 
Committee: 
(a) To buy or sell U.S. Government securities, including securities of the Federal Financing Bank, 
and securities that are direct obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any 
agency of the United States in the open market, from or to securities dealers and foreign and 
international accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on a cash, regular, or 
deferred delivery basis, for the System Open Market Account at market prices, and, for such 
Account, to exchange maturing U.S. Government and Federal agency securities with the Treasury 
or the individual agencies or to allow them to mature without replacement; 
(b) To buy U.S. Government securities, obligations that are direct obligations of, or fully 
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the United States, from dealers for the 
account of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under agreements for repurchase of such 
securities or obligations in 65 business days or less, at rates that, unless otherwise expressly 
authorized by the Committee, shall be determined by competitive bidding, after applying 
reasonable limitations on the volume of agreements with individual dealers; provided that in the 
event Government securities or agency issues covered by any such agreement are not repurchased 
by the dealer pursuant to the agreement or a renewal thereof, they shall be sold in the market or 
transferred to the System Open Market Account. 
(c) To sell U.S. Government securities and obligations that are direct obligations of, or fully 
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the United States to dealers for System 
Open Market Account under agreements for the resale by dealers of such securities or obligations 
in 65 business days or less, at rates that, unless otherwise expressly authorized by the Committee, 
shall be determined by competitive bidding, after applying reasonable limitations on the volume of 
agreements with individual dealers. 
2. In order to ensure the effective conduct of open market operations, the Federal Open Market Committee 
authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend on an overnight basis U.S. Government 
securities held in the System Open Market Account to dealers at rates that shall be determined by 
competitive bidding. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall set a minimum lending fee consistent 
with the objectives of the program and apply reasonable limitations on the total amount of a specific issue 
that may be auctioned and on the amount of securities that each dealer may borrow. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York may reject bids which could facilitate a dealer's ability to control a single issue as 
determined solely by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
3. In order to ensure the effective conduct of open market operations, while assisting in the provision of 
short-term investments for foreign and international accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York and accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as fiscal agent of the United 
States pursuant to Section 15 of the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Open Market Committee authorizes 
and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (a) for System Open Market Account, to sell U.S. 
Government securities to such accounts on the bases set forth in paragraph l(a) under agreements providing 
for the resale by such accounts of those securities in 65 business days or less on terms comparable to those 
available on such transactions in the market; and (b) for New York Bank account, when appropriate, to       
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undertake with dealers, subject to the conditions imposed on purchases and sales of securities in paragraph 
l(b), repurchase agreements in U.S. Government and agency securities, and to arrange corresponding sale 
and repurchase agreements between its own account and such foreign, international, and fiscal agency 
accounts maintained at the Bank. Transactions undertaken with such accounts under the provisions of this 
paragraph may provide for a service fee when appropriate. 
4. In the execution of the Committee’s decision regarding policy during any intermeeting period, the 
Committee authorizes and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, upon the instruction of the 
Chairman of the Committee, to adjust somewhat in exceptional circumstances the degree of pressure on 
reserve positions and hence the intended federal funds rate. Any such adjustment shall be made in the 
context of the Committee’s discussion and decision at its most recent meeting and the Committee’s long-
run objectives for price stability and sustainable economic growth, and shall be based on economic, 
financial, and monetary developments during the intermeeting period. Consistent with Committee practice, 
the Chairman, if feasible, will consult with the Committee before making any adjustment. 
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APPENDIX B:  GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF SYSTEM OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 
IN FEDERAL AGENCY ISSUES 
 
The FOMC has established specific guidelines for operations in agency securities to ensure that Federal 
Reserve operations do not have undue market effects and do not serve to support individual issuers.  The 
guidelines are reprinted below. 
 
 
Guidelines for the Conduct of System Operations in Federal Agency Issues 
1.  System open market operations in Federal agency issues are an integral part of total System open 
market operations designed to influence bank reserves, money market conditions, and monetary 
aggregates. 
 
2.  System open market operations in Federal agency issues are not designed to support individual 
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